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Tokayev's Reform and the Transformation of Kazakhstan's Presidential Patronage Network

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Abstract

The patronage network of the president of Kazakhstan has undergone a long process of evolution and change. The patronage network is a tool for the president of Kazakhstan to deal with the crisis of state power and a supplement to the immature nation system of Kazakhstan, but it also gives birth to the wave of group politics and elite struggle, affects the orderly development of the country, and causes the public to question its legitimacy. In response to the above problems, Tokayev, who came to power in 2019, took "system penetration" as the core strategy to promote the transformation of Kazakhstan's presidential patronage network. Tokayev's reform has effectively stimulated Kazakhstan's political vitality and pointed out a new direction for the country's institutional modernization. However, it is also faced with a variety of complex factors at home and abroad. The key is that the contradictory relationship between the patronage network and the nation system needs a long period of adjustment, and the transformation of the patronage network still has a long way to go before the "system penetration" causes a qualitative change. It's concluded that Tokayev's subjective willingness to reform is constrained by various objective factors, the long-standing contradictory relationship between the presidential patronage network and the nation system is difficult to reconcile in the short term, and the complementarity and competition between the presidential patronage network and the nation system will remain the political reality of Kazakhstan in the long run before the "system penetration" has caused a qualitative change.

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Keywords

Kazakhstan, presidential patronage network, nation system, system integration, system penetration.

Introduction

Kazakhstan has long been known as an "island of stability" in Central Asia because of its relatively stable political situation, and the patronage network built around the president is an important part of the country's presidential power structure. The presidential patronage network plays a "double-edged sword" role in Kazakhstan politics: on the one hand, it establishes and stabilizes the symbiotic relationship between the president and the political elite, and becomes a powerful medium for the president to maintain the stability of the regime. On the other hand, its structural imbalance has brought uncertainty to the political situation, leading to the emergence of several rounds of political chaos, such as the Ablyazov incident and the Zhanaozin incident. Presidential patronage network is a common political phenomenon in post-Soviet transition countries, especially in Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries, which has been studied and discussed by researchers. At the beginning of 2022, nationwide riots suddenly broke out in Kazakhstan with astonishing intensity [Kudaibergenova, 2022]. After the incident subsided, President Tokayev called for large-scale reform, pointing directly at Kazakhstan's long-standing presidential patronage network, which once again aroused the attention of the research community on related issues.

The concept of patron-client relationship first appeared in the field of anthropology and was first introduced into the field of political science by Scott and other scholars [Scott, 1972]. They believe that in the patronage relationship, the patron with higher political status uses his authority, influence and resources to provide protection and other benefits to the asylum seeker, while the asylum recipient needs to provide loyalty and support in return, and they all form a dual exchange model with verticality and reciprocity. There may also be intermediaries in patronage relationships [Eisenstadt, 1984], who are sheltered by higher-level patrons, and at the same time shelter their own clients, thus forming a pyramidal patron-client network [Lin Danyang, 2018].

If patronage relationships and patronage networks refer to the widespread micro-phenomena among people of different social status, then patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism theories focus on the macro-power operation mode of the supreme power of the state radiating to the nation politics. The theory of patrimonialism, derived from Marx Weber's theory of the sources of authority, is often used to explore a political system in which rulers exercise power according to kinship, patronage, personal loyalty, and combinations thereof. The theory of neopatrimonialism was put forward by Eisenstadt in 1973 to describe the coexistence of traditional patrimonialism and modern bureaucracy in some countries' political systems, and to emphasize the penetration of patronage into the formal political system constructed according to the logic of legal rationality [Eisenstadt, 1984].

The introduction of patrimonialism theory into the studies of Central Asian politics is a relatively recent phenomenon. In the early research work, the research community focused on the "core factors" of patrimonialism in Central Asian countries, such as exploring the central role of clan identity in the operation of nation power. Kathleen Collins and Edward Schatz have pointed out that the political, economic and social relations of Central Asian countries in the post-Soviet era are rooted in clan identity, and clan relations are the core of patrimonialism. This kind of research shows the influence of traditional factors on the politics of Central Asian transition countries, but it also has the limitations of one-sided, static and isolated opinions, overemphasizing the core role of a certain factor, and almost lacking the discussion of modern bureaucratic politics.

The peak of political research in Central Asia in the West is marked by the creative application of the theory of neopatrimonialism [Sun Chao, 2019]. Compared with the early research perspective, the neopatrimonialism has a stronger explanatory power: First, it covers the patronage logic composed of multiple factors, corrects the one-sided tendency in the early research, and is closer to the political reality of Central Asian countries. Secondly, the neopatrimonialism focuses on the dynamic operation

of patronage networks, which is helpful to study the characteristics and influencing factors of their structural evolution. Thirdly, the dual perspective of formal and informal politics in the connotation of neopatrimonialism is helpful to the study of the interaction between patronage networks and nation politics.

Nevertheless, the neopatrimonialism theory still has some limitations. This theory has an obvious apriorist tendency, implying the transmission of Western universal values. It regards the developed countries in Europe and America as the ultimate goal of democratic transformation and the typical model of formal politics, while the patronage network in Central Asian countries is defined as informal system and regarded as an obstacle to the construction of democratic system. Facts have proved that patronage network is not the "exclusive" phenomenon of developing countries and the third world, and its impact on the modern nation system is not entirely negative, and the neopatrimonialism theory has a narrower understanding of it. Chinese scholars of Central Asian studies, such as Yang Shu and Zeng Xianghong, have long pointed out that informal institutions ensure the stability of Central Asian countries in the process of transition to a certain extent, and that countries should achieve a positive interaction between formal and informal politics and explore a path of transition in line with their political conditions [Yang Shu, Zeng Xianghong, 2007]. Sun Chao thinks that the system construction has become the theme of the centralized state construction in Central Asian countries, and the Central Asian politics has broken through the dual logic of formal/informal system, and is forming the development trend of "integration" of nation system and patronage politics.

Because this paper is limited to the macro-power operation mode of Kazakhstan's supreme power radiating to nation politics, and this mode is manifested as a pyramid-like patronage network with the president as the core, this paper takes the patronage network of Kazakhstan's president as the research object. The patronage network of the Kazakhstan president is not confined to any facet such as clan, politics and economy, but an interest group composed of various factors. In the changing political environment, the inner balance of the patronage network of the Kazakh president determines the stability of the regime. There is a high degree of interaction between the patronage network of the President of Kazakhstan and the nation system, and the boundary is increasingly blurred, so it is difficult to frame it with the opposite logic of formal/informal system. This paper argues that there is a complementary, competitive and integrated relationship between the patronage network and the nation system, which determines the evolution and change of the former. Based on the actual situation of Kazakhstan, this paper analyzes and integrates the theories mentioned above, and tries to explore the following questions: what kind of evolution process did the Kazakhstan presidential patronage network go through, what characteristics did its structural changes show, what factors influenced it, and what changes will Tokayev's reform bring to the Kazakhstan presidential patronage network?

The Transformation of Patronage Network under Tokayev's Reform: Background and Content

In 2019, Tokayev succeeded Nazarbayev as the new president of Kazakhstan. Under the complex political environment of "Kazakh Spring", Tokayev was faced with the severe task of maintaining the stability of the regime and adjusting the relationship between the state and society. Faced with the public's doubts about the authorities, Tokayev has launched several waves of political reform programs, whose important goal is to weaken Kazakhstan's long-standing presidential patronage network. This was reinforced by the "New Kazakhstan" strategy proposed by Tokayev after the "tragic January" events in 2022. Under Tokayev's reform, Kazakhstan's long-standing presidential patronage network has embarked on the road of transformation.

Legitimacy Foundation from Mass Society: Realistic Background and Favorable Conditions of Tokayev's Reform

As mentioned above, the patronage network of the President of Kazakhstan is a "game only for the elite", and the political elite is its absolute beneficiary, while the mass society is excluded from the system. However, the presidential patronage network is not supported by a clear national legal logic, and its legitimate status mainly stems from the recognition attitude of the mass society.

During the first 20 years when the first president of Kazakhstan was in power, the mass society acquiesced in the presidential patronage network, and the political situation in Kazakhstan showed a significant stability during this period. The rise in international oil prices, the economic development of leading regions and the call of the authorities for "first economy, then politics" have effectively increased the tolerance of the Kazakh public for the presidential patronage network [Ziegler, 2010]. The rapid growth of the economy is really just a microcosm of the development picture created by the first president. Proclaiming an independent, prosperous, and politically stable country, he frequently updated his ambitious national development strategy and established a bustling new capital, Astana, as a support for the legitimacy of his power [Tutumlu, 2019]. In the international arena, unlike Putin's regime, Nazarbayev actively promoted Kazakhstan's integration into the process of globalization, and promoted Kazakhstan's international influence and status through a series of diplomatic activities [Busygina, 2019]. The above words and actions, which highlight the color of populism or charisma, paint a beautiful picture of development for Kazakhstan citizens and conceal the contradiction between the presidential patronage network and the mass society.

In 2005-2006, Kazakhstan promulgated the Law on National Social Order and the Concept of Civil Society Development, which aims to "establish a harmonious and fair partnership among government organizations, enterprises and non-governmental organizations" [Pierobon, 2016]. In practice, however, the Act provides for a State funding relationship for NGOs, which results in few civil society organizations being able to maintain their activities without state funding, and the mass society has thus evolved into a grass-roots organization sponsored and supported by the state. These organizations are obviously unable to play a supervisory role in the political system, but are involved in informal interest networks. In other words, the bill fails to establish an effective agreement between the presidential patronage network and the mass society, fails to exchange the acquiescence of the latter again, and deepens the potential contradiction between the two.

With the fluctuation of international oil prices and the deterioration of the country's economy, the public's belief in a bright future began to collapse. The grim economic situation has led to a wave of protests in the last decade of the first presidential regime, while the rise of internet politics and the broad political participation of young people have fully exposed the long-standing "elite game" to the public society [Sairambay, 2021]. The above process stimulated the change of the status of the patronage network and made it completely lose its legitimacy, which prompted the new president to launch a new policy to reform the patronage network and adjust the tension between the state authorities and the mass society.

At the beginning of the new year in 2022, the price of liquefied petroleum gas in the western region of Kazakhstan rose sharply, causing strong dissatisfaction among the local people, and local protests quickly evolved into nationwide riots of astonishing intensity in a short period of time, which had a major impact on Kazakhstan's national security. After the "tragic January" subsided, the root problem behind it once again aroused the concern of the authority. In his subsequent State of the Union address, Tokayev repeatedly pointed his finger at the patronage network of the Kazakhstan and stressed the

necessity and urgency of political reform. The sudden outbreak of the crisis further accelerated the pace of Kazakhstan's institutional transformation, and Tokayev also adapted to the current situation and seized the opportunity to put forward the concept of "New Kazakhstan", shaping a completely different political image from the first president. According to the relevant statistical results, about 70% of Kazakhstan citizens support the reform measures proposed by Tokayev, believing that the policies announced by him are conducive to improving the living standards of the people and promoting the rapid development of the national economy. It should be said that Tokayev's reform has a strong public opinion base, which has created favorable conditions for the transformation of Kazakhstan's presidential patronage network.

Direct Adjustment of the Patronage Network: The Specific Content of Tokayev's Reform

The construction of "New Kazakhstan" is an important goal of Tokayev's reform, the adjustment of political power structure is the foundation and key of its construction [Wang Jinguo, Wang Jiong, 2023], and the presidential patronage network is the core object of its reform. The specific content of Tokayev's reform mainly includes the following three aspects.

First. Deconstructing the patronage network of the first president. As early as during the "tragic January" Tokayev replaced former Prime Minister Mamin and former Chairman of the National Security Council Masimov. After the situation stabilized, Tokayev began to adjust the patronage network of the first president on a larger scale. On January 1, 2022, Tokayev made a direct statement in the Parliament on the relationship between Nazarbayev's cronies and domestic corruption. On the 14th, Nazarbayev's eldest son-in-law and youngest son-in-law terminated their positions as chairman of the board of directors of the Kazakhstan Natural Gas and Oil Transport Company. On the 17th, his second son-in-law, Kulibayev, resigned as chairman of the "Ata-meken" Entrepreneurs Association. His nephew and former first vice-chairman of the National Security Committee was dismissed. The production and recycling company related to the corruption case of Nazarbayev's little daughter was immediately exposed and nationalized. Tokayev also changed the name of the capital from "Nur-sultan" to "Astana" and announced the abolition of the First President Act, which safeguarded his status. All these measures are aimed at deconstructing the presidential patronage network of the Nazarbayev's era.

Second. Limit the power of the president and eliminate the patronage relationship. In terms of executive power, Tokayev intends to organize a referendum on constitutional amendment, and then announced that the president should maintain non-partisan status, prohibit close relatives of the president from holding leading positions in state departments and state-owned enterprises, with a term limit of seven years, and not participate in re-election. Tokayev also mobilized technocrats without government experience to form a cabinet. In terms of legislative power, the number of representatives nominated by the president in the Senat has been reduced from 15 to 10, the threshold for the registration of political parties and the threshold for political parties to enter Parliament have been lowered, and the Constitutional Court has been added to protect citizens' rights and interests. In terms of local autonomy, he promoted the enactment of a local autonomy law, which abolished the direct appointment of township officials by the President and replaced them with local elections, which is also being extended to municipal governance. All these measures are aimed at adjusting Kazakhstan's political power structure and reducing the space for patronage and corruption.

Third. Build a "listening state" and establish a dialogue mechanism between the authorities and society. Tokayev's reform takes the "listening state" as its core concept, emphasizes the continuous

dialogue between the authorities and society, and establishes an effective feedback platform. He advocated greater involvement of citizens and civil society institutions in the process of reforming and governing the country and improving the operational efficiency of State institutions and the living standards of the people [Chebotarev, 2021]. Under the guidance of the above guidelines, Tokayev established the mechanism of the National Social Trust Conference. As an advisory body directly under the President, the main objective of the mechanism is to make recommendations on hot issues of national policy on the basis of extensive discussions with the public, political parties and representatives of mass society, which may be included in the reform plan by the President. The mechanism has held six meetings and formulated amendments to the Peaceful Assembly Law, the Electoral Law and the Political Party Law, which are related to the people's political power. As a newly created state system, it fills in the gaps in the positive interaction between the mass society and the regime and plays a supervisory role in the political system.

To sum up, Tokayev takes "New Kazakhstan" as the key reform idea, and promotes the transformation of Kazakhstan's political system by deconstructing the patronage network, restricting the power of the president, and encouraging social supervision, which has launched a major impact on Kazakhstan's long-standing presidential patronage network and reflects the new direction of Kazakhstan's political modernization.

The Restraining Factors and Countermeasures of the Transformation of Kazakhstan Presidential Patronage Network

Although Tokayev seized the opportunity to start the process of political modernization in line with Kazakhstan's historical development trend, his reform plan still faces constraints from various factors at home and abroad. The patronage network of the President of Kazakhstan has affected the deep-seated contradictions accumulated over the past 30 years since the country's independence, and it is difficult to complete a thorough transformation in a short time and achieve immediate results. For these constraints, Tokayev has designed corresponding strategies to eliminate their adverse effects as far as possible.

The constraints of the existing patronage network and power structure

Tokayev's reform intends to reduce the patronage network, but the huge elite system of the Nazarbayev's era can not be completely disintegrated in a short time. As a new president, if he breaks the existing power structure too radically, it is likely to cause domestic political turmoil. Tokayev must maintain the internal balance of the existing patronage network in order to consolidate political power. After the "tragic January" subsided, Tokayev made a major adjustment to the military security department, appointed Saginbayev and other confidants, appointed his confidant Karin as State Secretary, and attracted officials under the former President and Prime Minister to serve himself. It can be seen that Tokayev did not completely abandon the use of the presidential patronage network, but focused on maintaining the balance between the old and new elite groups, so as to maintain the stability of the regime, gradually accumulate strength, and provide a favorable political environment for reform.

In order to maintain the internal balance of the existing patronage network, Tokayev also inherited the political wisdom of the first president. In the Nazarbayev era, the Kazakhstan president often promoted the integration of various groups through the transfer of political elite positions to prevent

group competition from causing the imbalance of patronage networks and undermining the stability of the regime. For example, Tokayev, who once served as prime minister, returned to the upper house in 2013 after a long diplomatic career and was considered the successor to the president. Masimov, who once served as Tokayev's deputy, moved back and forth among Kazakhstan's three major power departments (government, enterprises, and security agencies). Nazarbayeva has long maintained a strong influence in Parliament and the ruling party. The above-mentioned personnel come from different groups in the "pyramid" structure and move between different departments due to the deliberate arrangement of the President. This model results in the decentralization of the patronage network, reduces the possibility of closed, rigid and excessive competition among elite groups, and has a positive impact on the stability of the regime. After Tokayev came to power, he also inherited the above political wisdom, promoted the mobilization of political elites of various groups among the presidential palace, cabinet, security departments and economic departments, and created "multiple horizontal flows beyond exclusiveness" [Groce, 2020] in the whole presidential patronage network, so as to maintain the dynamic balance of the whole system.

The Contradictory Relationship between the Presidential Patronage Network and the Nation System

Since the independence of Kazakhstan, the patronage network of the president and the nation system have maintained a contradictory relationship of complementarity and competition for a long time. The patronage network of the president has a "double-edged sword" effect on the nation system of Kazakhstan, and the president has to rely on the patronage tradition to maintain political stability in the case of imperfect nation system. However, the excessive evolution of patronage network can easily erode the operation space of the nation system, threaten the orderly development of the state, and then arouse the discontent of the mass society. At present, Tokayev is trying to reduce the patronage network left over from the time of Nazarbayev, but the new patronage network seems to be growing day by day. Will this phenomenon continue and intensify in the future, and will Tokayev return to the pace of his predecessor? The answer to this question does not depend on the will of individual leaders, but on the objective political environment of Kazakhstan, that is, whether Kazakhstan's nation system construction is mature and whether there is room for the operation of the presidential patronage network. That is to say, the core of Kazakhstan's political transformation lies in the change of the relationship between the presidential patronage network and the nation system.

Sun Chao, a Chinese scholar, has pointed out that institution building is the core content of Central Asian politics and the key to its political modernization at the present stage. Central Asian politics is breaking through the binary logic of formal/informal institutions, and the antagonistic relationship between them is being replaced by institutional integration. Institutional integration can be divided into "system integration" and "system penetration", the former refers to the integration of the patronage network into the national system, the latter refers to the establishment of a new nation system to reduce the operation space of the patronage network. The above analysis framework provides a new perspective to examine the relationship between the two.

To sum up, in his time, the president also tried to reconcile the patronage network and the nation system, but the main strategy he adopted was "system penetration", whose essence was to use the nation system to restrain the patronage network and seek complementary benefits between the two, so as to maintain the stability of the regime as the ultimate goal. By contrast, the measures taken by Tokayev can be regarded as "system penetration". Whether it is the readjustment of the power structure or the

establishment of the national social trust conference mechanism, the direct goal is to crack down on the patronage network, and to take a moderate and gradual way of penetration, through the establishment of a new political system, gradually occupy the operation space of the patronage network. It should be said that "system penetration" is a strategic choice made by Tokayev based on the consideration of the reality of Kazakhstan's nation conditions, and it is a transformation path in line with it.

Intervention of external factors

It is noteworthy that Tokayev's "New Kazakhstan" strategy is not only a response to the "tragic January" in Kazakhstan, but also a statement on the dramatic changes in the situation in Eurasia after the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Since its independence, Kazakhstan has developed a multilateral and balanced foreign policy for a long time. After the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the diplomat-born Tokayev and his team responded flexibly to the above situation, and their reform blueprint had a strong "Westernization" color, but they also adhered to the principled line of Eurasian integration, trying to seek a balance among multiple vectors. Nevertheless, the transformation of the patronage network of the President of Kazakhstan is still vulnerable to the intervention of various external factors.

In the process of reforming the presidential patronage network and building a "listening state", Tokayev is building a national united front with independent politicians, well-known public figures and even the opposition, so as to achieve a "rebalancing" of power between neighboring and foreign powers. After the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the Kazakhstan mass society, represented by the above-mentioned people, held a uniform attitude of "alienating Russia" and "supporting Tokayev", hoping that Tokayev would take a clear stand on this. Tokayev's tough stance at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and his subsequent measures to alienate Russia's integration mechanism are all based on the above citizens' opinions. With the help of public opinion, the diplomatic veteran Tokayev sought to "rebalance" power between Russia and the West, adopted a "Russian" position to avoid the harm of diplomatic dilemma and secondary sanctions, and regained a "pro-American" attitude to seek endorsement for domestic democratic reform. This trend has undoubtedly caused dissatisfaction in Russia, and has given some warning through the Novorossiysk energy pipeline incident. In the future, Russia may still intervene in Kazakhstan's political transformation by means of information warfare and trade barriers.

The "tragic January" incident has the shadow of the "color revolution" and the "three forces" at the same time, and these two factors may interfere with Kazakhstan's political transformation in the future. Although Tokayev's new policy has a certain tendency of "Westernization", Kazakhstan will not completely turn to the road of "Westernization". The United States and the West are likely to use the name of "democratic review" to exert adverse influence on Kazakhstan's political order in order to maintain their diplomatic dominance and priority. With the lowering of the threshold of political party activities, the "three forces" may combine with Kazakhstan's domestic forces, thus creating unrest. After the abolition of the death penalty, Kazakhstan also lacks effective means to suppress its activities, which will undoubtedly affect the country's political transformation process.

In response to the above interference factors, while adhering to the development of a multi-faceted and balanced foreign policy, Kazakhstan actively relies on the "Belt and Road" and the Shanghai Cooperation Mechanism to create stable and favorable external conditions for domestic political transformation. Kazakhstan government officials have frequently pointed out that Kazakhstan regards China as its main economic and political partner, and the "Belt and Road" initiative and the SCO will

become the main mechanisms for Kazakhstan to further develop economic and security cooperation. With the help of the above diplomatic platform, Kazakhstan can not only ease its relations with Russia, continue to participate in the construction of greater Eurasian integration, but also obtain regional security public goods, and avoid the risks brought to its stability by factors such as the "color revolution" and the three forces. China firmly supports Kazakhstan's independent choice of development path and supports its government in taking necessary measures to maintain domestic stability, inter-ethnic harmony and promote social and economic development. The deepening of cooperation between Kazakhstan and China in various fields will inject strong impetus into the transformation and development of their countries.

Conclusion

Kazakhstan's presidential patronage network has undergone a long period of evolution and change. In the early days of independence, the first president set out to establish various forms of patronage as a response to the crisis of national transformation. In the stage of evolution, the political elites recognize, internalize and copy the fixed presidential patronage logic, which brings "quantitative" and "qualitative" changes to the presidential patronage network, forming a complete system structure and a complete system regulation mechanism, and leading to the emergence of a long-term tradition of political patronage. In the late period of Nazarbayev's regime, the excessive evolution of patronage network seriously threatened the orderly development of the country, and the depressed economic situation aroused the discontent of the public society, so the presidential patronage network needed to be transformed urgently. After Tokayev came to power, he launched several waves of reform programs in succession, aiming to promote the transformation of the presidential patronage network. Based on the consideration of the reality of Kazakhstan's national conditions, Tokayev adopted the core strategy of "system penetration", which made Kazakhstan embark on the road of political transformation with clear objectives and gradual relaxation, and Kazakhstan's politics showed the development trend of centralized national system construction.

To what extent will Tokayev's reform change the patronage network of the Kazakhstan president? It is undeniable that Tokayev has brought a fresh and dynamic political fashion to Kazakhstan. For example, at the beginning of the establishment of the National Social Trust Conference mechanism, some scholars believed that its real role was to promote the depoliticization of the public through consultation ideology, which could not actually promote the progress of the system. However, judging from the final results, the six congresses of the Conference have formed more than 90 laws and bills that have been finally passed, including the Peaceful Assembly Law, the Electoral Law, the Political Party Law and the abolition of the death penalty. The "system penetration" model adopted by the mechanism is of symbolic significance, which represents the determination and attempt to crack down on the presidential patronage network and promote the modernization of the national system.

For all that, Kazakhstan has a long way to go to reform the presidential patronage network. Although Tokayev has removed the control of the first president's cronies over state power and wealth, and provided a platform for the public to supervise and restrict informal systems, the current "power vacuum" still leaves room for political strongmen and political elites to rebuild their patronage networks. The key lies in the fact that Tokayev's subjective willingness to reform is constrained by various objective factors, the long-standing contradictory relationship between the presidential patronage network and the nation system is difficult to reconcile in the short term, and the complementarity and competition between the presidential patronage network and the nation system

will remain the political reality of Kazakhstan in the long run before the "system penetration" has caused a qualitative change.

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Реформа Токаева и трансформация патрон-клиентской сети Президента Казахстана

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Аннотация

Патрон-клиентская сеть Президента Казахстана претерпела длительный процесс эволюции и изменений. Патрон-клиентская сеть является для Президента Казахстана инструментом борьбы с кризисом государственной власти и дополнением к незрелой национальной системе, но она также порождает волну групповой политики и борьбы элит, влияет на упорядоченное развитие стране и заставляет общественность усомниться в ее легитимности. В ответ на вышеупомянутые проблемы Токаев, пришедший к власти в 2019 году, взял «системное проникновение» в качестве основной стратегии по содействию трансформации патрон-клиентской сети. Реформа Токаева эффективно стимулировала политическую жизнеспособность Казахстана и указала новое направление институциональной модернизации страны. Однако он также сталкивается с множеством сложных факторов внутри страны и за рубежом. Ключ в том, что противоречивые отношения между патрон-клиентской сетью и национальной системой нуждаются в длительном периоде регулирования, а патрон-клиентской сети Президента Казахстана еще предстоит пройти долгий путь, прежде чем «системное проникновение» приведет к качественным изменениям.

Для цитирования в научных исследованиях

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Ключевые слова

Казахстан, патрон-клиентская сеть, национальная система, системная интеграция, системное проникновение.

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